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In recent years the common law of contract has been greatly altered by 
the provisions of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970, the Contractual Mistakes 
Act 1977 and the Contractual Remedies Act 1979. Each of these statutes 
was based on a report of the Contracts and Commcrcial Law Reform 
Committee and each was conceived as a purely contractual reform. Yet 
the law of contract does not exist in vacuo. Many contracts impinge upon 
other fields of law. It  is a common feature of each of the Reports of the 
Committee that the effect of the contractual reform on such other areas of 
law is not considered.' This is the more curious since before completion 
of the reports upon which the Contractual Mistakes Act and the Contrac- 
tual Remedies Act were based the applicability of the earlier Illegal Con- 
tracts Act in the company law area had already been canvassed.Vhe 
purpose oF this article is to consider the possible application of the Con- 
tractual Mistakes Act and the Contractual Remedies Act to various areas 
of company law. 
( I  ) The Contructuul Mistakes Act 1977 
The Contractual Mistakes Act was designed to replace the common law 
relating to mistake. It is a code, and thus completely replaces the old 
rules e x q t  those areas exempted in s.5(2) of the Act. These include 
rectification, non est factum, and "misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or 
innocent"." Relief is to be given only where the party seeking relief can 
bring himself within the criteria laid down in s.6(1). Firstly he must show 
that he was mistaken as to a material matter, and that this mistake was 
known to the other party to the contract, or that all the parties to the 
contract were influenced by the same mistake, or that at least two parties 
to the contract (being parties with dissimilar interests under it), were infl u- 
enced by different mistakes as to the same matter. Then he must show that 
the mistake caused a substantially unequal exchange of values or the 
conferment of a benefit or imposition of an obligation disproportionate 
to the consideration therefor. Lastly he must show that if there is any term 
in the contract which obliges one party to take the risk of a mistake, that 
The Report on Misrepresentation and Breach does cite certain company law cases. 
e.g. a n  its discussion of the bars to rescission at p.60, but no consideration is given 
to specific r~iles of company law. The Report on Privity of Contract does consider 
the wider application of the proposed reform, but the draft Bill appears, in part, to 
run counter to the view taken in the report itself. 
V e e  the discussion by Mahon J in Coleman v Myers [I9771 2 NZLR 225, 287 of 
the possible validation of a contract rendered illegal by s.62 of the Companies 
Act 1955. 
' C.M.A. s .5 (2 )  ( c ) .  
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he is not that party. (It must be borne in mind that the actual application 
for relief need not come from the party making the mistake, it may be 
made by a party claiming through him, or by any other person for whom 
it is material to know if relief would be granted.4) Once the grounds for 
relief are established, the court has a very wide range of possible remedies 
(set oul in s.7, though limited as against third parties by s.8). These 
remedie5 are not, however, supposed to be exercised "in such a way as to 
prejudice the general security of contractual relationships."" 
A key provision, and one wliich may greatly increase the applicability 
of the Contractual Mistakes Act to company law, is the definition of mistake. 
The Act broadens the field of mistake to include mistake of law as well 
as mistake of fact. A mistake in the interpretation of a document is gener- 
ally to be a mistake of law.6 Certainly the only purpose of the reformers 
was to get away from the difficulties found at common law in deciding 
whcther a case was one of mistake of fact or of law, but it is clear that the 
po5sible ambit of the Act has been greatly widened by the inclusion of 
mi5take of law. 
The second key provi\ion in the statute is that of s.2(3)-that there is 
a contract for the purposes of the Act "where a contract would have 
come into existence but for circumstances of the kind described in 
s.6(l)(a) of this Act". This cannot mean that the Act only applies where 
the mistake would ai common law have rendered the contract void, 
because clearly the Act covers cases where the contract would have been 
voidable in equity as well. Thus some other meaning must be found, and 
it is submitted that the provision covers the situation where there would 
have been a contract if the position had been as the mistaken party or 
parties believed it to be. Provided the error has had the effect of putting 
one party at a disadvantage, the Act may give relief. If this interpretation 
is correct, it widens the applicability of the Act, because there are many 
situations where an error of law by the parties will prevent them from 
forming the contract they thought they had made. 
The third provision of the Act which is critical to its application to the 
company law field is s.4(2). This makes it clear that the provisions of 
the Act are supplementary to other remedies for things other than mistakes, 
but goes on to say that the new remedies "are not to be exercised in such 
a way as to prejudice the general security of contractual relationships." That 
provision was inserted by the Statutes Revision Committee of Parliament, 
apparently to allay the fears of some sectors of the commercial world that 
this Act would provide an easy escape route for persons wishing to escape 
from contracts which had ceased to be as profitable as expected. The 
criteria for mistake alone render the provision almost superfiuous, but it 
may check the willingness of the courts to use the Act in fields outside 
the traditional contract law area. Tt is however, suggested that in many 
cases to give relief under the Mistakes Act will be to increa~e commercial 
certainty, in that the current rules of company law often disappoint the 
expectations of one or both parties at the time of making the agreement 
later impeached. 
' C.M.A. s.7(4). 
C.M.A. s.4(2). 
' C.M.A. s.2(2). 
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(2) The Contractuul Remedies Act 1979 
This measure makes two major changes to the law relating to misrepre- 
sentation, repudiation and breach of contract. The first is that any misrep- 
resentation, be it fraudulent, negligent or innocent, gives rise to an action 
for damages. Damages are to be assessed as if the representation were a 
term of the contract that has been broken7 The second is the substitution 
of a new procedure called "cancellation" for rescission and discharge for 
breach. Cancellation of a contract freezes the parties' position as at the 
time of cancellation, excusing further performance but not requiring the 
return of any property or money transferred pursuant to the contract. How- 
ever, cancellation may be complemented by an action for damages for 
breach or misrepresentation so that cancellation does not determine the 
position of the parties.* The grounds for cancellation are set out in s.7 of 
the Act. Repudiation of all or part of the contract entitles the other party 
to cancel at any time. Misrepresentation will entitle cancellation if the 
parties have impliedly or expressly agreed that the truth of the representa- 
tion is essential to the cancelling party or its falseness substantially reduces 
his benefits or increases his burdens under the contract. A breach entitling 
cancellation must also be as to a matter agreed to be essential or where 
non-performance substantially weakens the cancelling party's position. 
However, cancellation may be available where the breach is still in the 
future, if it is obvious that it will occur. 
Under the Act, the court may make orders for compensation to be paid 
to any party to a cancelled contract. or for property to be transferred from 
one party to another. Where damages have been awarded for breach or 
misrepresentation, the amount to be awarded must be reduced by the 
amount of any compensation awarded to the person recovering damages. 
Thus there is a discretionary remedy available which is in addition to 
damages, and may be used where damages do not lie. If damages are 
available, however, the injured party is entitled to them. Thus the Con- 
tractual Remedies Act differs from the Contractual Mistakes Act in that 
the remedies available are not totally discretionary. 
There is one major difference between the applicability of this Act and 
that of the Contractual Mistakes Act. The Contractual Remedies Act is 
not a code, and it may be expressly contracted out of by providing for 
other remedies in the contract i t ~ e l f , ~  or it may be made inapplicable by 
other statutes. There are a number of specific statutes exempted from the 
ambit of the Act, and s.l5(h) provides that nothing in the Act shall 
affect "any other enactment so far as it prescribes or governs terms of 
contracts or remedies available in respect of contracts, or governs the 
enforcement of contracts". This last provision is of considerable importance 
in terms of the company law, as there are some fields where there are 
specific statutory rules which may override the provisions of the Con- 
tractual Remedies Act. 
' C.R.A. s.6(1). 
C.R.A. s.8. 
C.R.A. s.5. 
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TIIE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATUTES 
The Contractual Mistakes Act is expressed not to affect the law relating 
to misrepresentation1" and the Contractual Remedies Act is cxpressed no1 
to affect the law relating to mistake." Thus it would seem that neither 
statute excludes the other, and therefore where appropriate relief may be 
sought under eithcr or both acts. As Dawson and MacLauchlan point outi2 
every misrepresentation, if believed, gives rise to a mistake-thus a deliber- 
ate misrepresentation by one party may lead to a mistake coming within 
4 ( 1 )  (a) (i) of the Contractgal Mistakes Act, and an innocent misrepre- 
sentation bring a situation covered by s .6( l)(a)  (ii) of that Act. It must 
be said that not all mistake cases will arise from a misrepresentation, in 
that the erroneous views of the parties may have arisen otherwise than from 
statements by the parties to the contract. 
Dawson and Mactauchlan conclude that in 5ome cases relief should be 
sought in the alternative under each statute, but in the cases where the 
actionable misrepresentation is clear "there is probably little to be gained 
from pursuing a remedy for mistake".17 
It may well be that the case for reliance on the Contractual Remedies 
Act where possible is stronger than this would indicate. The critical differ- 
ence between the Acts is that relief. whether it be compensation, setting 
aside or other relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act is entirely dis- 
cretionary. Thus even though a person may have fulfilled the pre-conditions 
for relief under that Act, the court may deny relief either on the merits 
or in pursuance of the statutory directive in s.4(2). Under the Contractual 
Remedies Act cancellation and/or damages may be available as a matter 
of right. This of course carries with it the advantage that the injured party 
may terminate of his own volition, rather than having to wait for a court 
to decide to exercise its discretion in his favour. 
It is curious that the relief provided by the two Acts should be differ- 
entiated in this way, in that there are some circumstances where the same 
fact situation would merit relief under either Act. If A has been induced 
to enter the contract by a misrepresentation, and the falsity of the misrep- 
resentation substantially reduces the value of his bagain, he would appear 
to be able to cancel under the Contractual Remedies Act, and to seek the 
discretionary relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act. It would be easier 
to rely solely on the former where the loss of value is clearly established. 
There will of course be cases where the Contractual Mistakes Act can 
be prayed in aid but not the Contractual Remediec Act. Where one or 
both parties is acting under a misapprehension as to the true facts, and 
the misapprehension has not arisen from the statements of the parties or 
their agents, there may be a mistake which would entitle relief. In these 
cases the applicant for relief will still have to show that there has resulted 
serious inequality of value of some kind. 
In  other cases, where the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed that 
a particular matter is escential, there is a right to cancel for misrepresenta- 
lo C.M.A. s.S(2)i(c). 
l1 C.R.A. s.4(b) 
""The Contractual Remedies Act 1979", Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, 1981, p.200. 
" Loc.cit. 
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tion, though there may not always be relief available under the Contractual 
Mistakes Act. It is not difficult to conceive of cases where although the 
parties are mistaken as lo a matter essential to them, there is no sub- 
stantial inequality of value where value is objectively measured. If A has 
stipulated that he will lend money to B Co., only if the company is active 
in a particular area, the stipulation as to its activities may be an essential 
matter to him, but it may well not affect the security provided for the loan. 
If the company is not in fact active in this area, there may be a right to 
cancel under the Contractual Remedies Act, but there would be no relief 
for mistake. 
Thus it would seem that although the Contractual Remedies Act and 
the Contractual Mistakes Act may well both apply to many fact situations, 
where the Contractual Remedies Act does apply it will never be less 
favourable to an injured party, and will often be more favourable. 
It is now intended to look at certain selected areas of company law 
where either or both of these statutes may apply in place of, or in con- 
junction with, the existing law. It is suggested that in many cases the 
results of the application of these statutes will yield results not foreseen 
by the Law Reform Committee, and which clearly indicate a need for a 
review of the contractual statutes. 
( 1 )  Pre-Zttcorporation Contracts 
The general position here is that any contract made by a person claim- 
ing to act on behalf of a company to be formed will be ineffective. If the 
contract discloses an intention by the "agent" to be personally liable, then 
the contract is binding upon him. The company is never bound.'* Yet thc 
cases disclose a number of situations in which these ure-incorporation con- 
tracts occur, and in some cases, at least, the new statutes may provide 
relief.15 
The first situation is where the parties have accurately ,described their 
position. A is contracting as "agentv or "trustee" for a company to be 
formed, and the other party is aware of this. Clearly there is no misrepre- 
sentation, and A cannot be liable for breach of warranty of authority, 
because he has not claimed full authority. If he represents that the pre- 
incorporation agreement will be binding, the representation is one of law, 
"See such cases as Kelner v Baxter (1866)  LR 2 CP 174. Newborne v Sensolid 
(Great Britain) Ltd [I9541 1 QB 45. 
'Yf the draft Bill proposed by the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Com- 
mittee in their Report on Privity of Contract and currently before Parliament is 
enacted without significant change, a contract between two parties which confers 
a benefit on a third party whether or not in existence will give that party a right 
to enforce the benefit. This would clearly allow the company a right to enforce 
contracts made with its promoters prior to incorporation. Where the company does 
attempt to enforce the benefit, the promisor of the benefit has available any defences 
which he would have had against the other contracting party. That the draft bill 
should have potential application to pre-incorporation contracts is surprising, as 
the Report, p.12, makes it clear that the Committee thought this area of the law 
v:as ogtside the scope of their brief. 
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and is almost certainly not covered by the Contractual Remedies Act. 
However, if such a representation was made with knowledge of its falsity, 
it would come within s.6(1) (a) (i) of the Contractual Mistakes Act, or if 
made without such knowledge, the position would come within s.6(1)- 
(a) (ii). An independently formed erroneous opinion on each side would 
lead again to the latter result. (Tt is not absolutely clear how the error 
arose in Oflicial Assignee of Motion v New Zedond Sero-Vaccines Ltd16 
but it appears to have been induced innocently by one of the agents for 
the company.) The question will then be whether in such circumstances a 
substantial inequality of value or consideration can be found so as to 
enlitle either party to seek relief under the Act. Here there are difficulties 
entailed in the terminology usually applied. Since the general law holds a 
pre-incorporation contract to be void, there are no binding obligations, 
and since neither side is bound, there is no inequality. Under the Con- 
tractual Mistakes Act. however, the question, where there is an arrange- 
ment that would have been a contract but for the mistake, is whether thc 
mistake resulted in what would have been an unequal exchange if the 
contract were otherwise valid. Where a person has supplied chattels or 
goods which are to be used for the purposes of the company to be formed, 
and relies for payment upon a belief that he may recover validly from the 
company, he may be able to claim that s.6(1) (b) (ii) of the Contractual 
Mistakes Act applies-in that he has conferred a benefit upon the other 
party which is substantially disproportionate to the consideration therefore. 
He has executed his part of the bargain, and is relying on an unenforce- 
able promise that the company, when incorporated, will carry out its side 
of the arrangement. The advantage to the applicant in relying on the 
Contractual Mistakes Act, rather than the possible alternative of an action 
for a quantum meruit or quantum valebant17 is that, in appropriate cases 
he might recover at least some of the profit available. In other cases, the 
consideration actually provided by the contractor might be such that no 
quantum meruit action would be available-as where A contracts with a 
company to be formed that he will cease to carry on an existing business 
which would be in competition with the company to be formed. If he has 
carried out his bargain. and closed his business, he has suffered a detri- 
ment which would not appear to be recoverable under any other action 
than one for relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act. If the agreement 
were declared valid, the expectations of the parties would be fulfilled. 
Holding parties to a bargain they thought they had made can hardly be 
described as threatening the security of contractual relationships. The dis- 
cretionary nature of the remedy would allow the court to refuse relief or 
vary the terms of the agreement if the original agreement was unfair to 
the company. As the law stands at present, the remedies of the contractor 
with an unincorporated company are extremely limited. Even a discre- 
tionary (and therefore uncertain) remedy under the Contractual Mistakes 
Act would be an improvement. 
The second situation is where the one or both of the parties acts on 
the mistaken belief that the company has already been incorporated. This 
belief may arise in several different ways, and different remedies may 
'"19351 NZLR 856, El9351 GLR 712. 
"See Re Empress Engineering Co. (1880) 16 Ch.D 125. 
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apply in the different cases. The first and simplest possibility is where, as 
in Wickberg v Shutsky,lR there is a deliberate misrepresentation by the 
person allegedly acting as the company's agent. In that case the plaintiff 
signed a contract of employment with a firm described in the contract as 
a limited liability company, and signed by the defendant as "President" 
of the company. The defendant knew that the firm was not incorporated. 
Dryer J held that there was no intention that the defendant be personally 
bound by the contract, and so no contractual remedy was available to the 
plaintiff. An action for breach of warranty of authority succeeded, but in 
this case the damages were purely nominal. Although the defendant had 
no authority to make such a contract, the plaintiff's loss by the termination 
of his employment was not due to the breach but to the insolvency of the 
firm. It is interesting that no tortious remedy for negligent misstatement 
or deceit was sought against the defendant. 
It would appear that in a similar situation in New Zealand, the aggrieved 
party would have a number of optionb. If he elects to proceed against the 
"agent7' h: would havc actions for breach of warranty of authority, but as 
Wickberg's case shows, he may have dificulty in showing that the breach 
was the real cause of his losses. A deceit action certainly would lie, but 
although loss of profit may be recovered in deceit,'"t may be that the 
agent is not worth suing. Certainly at common law, there could be no 
recourse against the company. The Contractual Remedies Act is of no 
application, because there is no contract with either the agent or the com- 
pany. If any relief against the company is to be sought, it must come 
through the Contractual Mistakes Act. Here there is a position where if 
the circumstances had been as the deceived person believed them to be 
there would have been a contract. 
Where the parties are acting in good faith, but erroneously believe that 
the company has been incorporated, there is clearly a common mistake of 
fact. There will have been misrepresentation by the persons holding them- 
selves out to be directors or agents of the company, simply by their 
description of themselves as such. But, again, there was no contract in- 
duced by the misrepresentation. Deceit will not lie for the statement if 
made in good faith, and the problems of causation may discourage reliance 
on the action for breach of warranty of authority.'" However, there is again 
a position where if the situation had been as the parties envisaged it, there 
would have been a contract. On that basis relief ought to be available 
under the Contractual Mistakes Act. However the mistake as to incorpor- 
ation arose, the applicant would have to establish an inequality of value, 
but there may be cases where this can be done. The facts of Hawkes Bay 
Milk Corporation v Watson20 may serve as an example. The plaintiff sup- 
plied large quantities of yoghurt to Endeavour Suppliers, believing, as did 
'' (1969) 4 DLR 744. 
'"See lewson Br Son v Arcos Lfd (1933) 47 L1.Rep. 93, Kitchen v Fordham 119551 
2 L1. Rep. 705 and Hornal v Neuburger Products Ltd [I9571 1 QB 247. 
I9aA claim for damages for breach of warranty of authority against the "agent" of 
an unincorporated "company" was upheld in the recent case of Lomax v Dankel 
k(1982) 29 SASR 68. 
" [I9741 1 NZLR 236. 
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the agents of that "company", that it had been incorporated. The com- 
pany was later incorporated, but went into liqui'dation. If the company had 
not gone into liquidation, but had refused to pay for the yoghurt supplied 
(and apparently resold) prior to incorporation, no action in contract would 
have lain. The only remedy open to the supplier would have bcen for a 
quantum meruit, and that might not be regarded as sufficient-in that he 
would not recoup his loss of profit, but merely his direct costs. It might 
also be the case that a person makes a long-term contract with what he 
believes to be an incorporated company for the exclusive supply of a 
certain product. If he expends time and money on adapting his business 
to enable him to perform that contract, and it is later disavowed by the 
company after it has been incorporated, (or even after they have accepted 
his goods for a short period) he has no recourse under the existing com- 
pany law for his costs. Yet there might well be a sufficient inequality of 
value in such circumstar~ces to satisfy a court that relief ought to be given 
under the Contractual Mistakes Act. The real argument against the exten- 
sion of the Contractual Mistakes Act to this area is that it will necessarily 
involve a form of lifting the corporate veil. To investigate the merits of 
the action, and the rclative equities in the dispute, the courts will have to 
look at the position within the company of the persons who had acted for 
it prior to its incorporation. If they are in reality the controllers of the 
company, it seems that the objections to binding the company to observe 
the bargains they had sought to make should be much diminished. In the 
case of fraudulent misrepresentation by an "agent" who is in fact a con- 
trolling figure of the company when incorporated (as was the defendant 
in Wickberg v Shatsky) the element of fraud alone should encourage the 
court to disregard the alleged separation of identities. In almost all the 
other reported cases on pre-incorporation contracts it appears that those 
"contracting" for it prior to incorporation have in fact laken ofice in it as 
directors. The reality of the cases is then that the directors have sought to 
avoid, by the operation of the legal rule making the contracts invalid, the 
consequences of the bargain they sought earlier to make. As Windeyer J 
said in Black v S d l w o o d ,  this does not accord well with a belief that 
bargains should be kept.21 Where the company after incorporation cannot 
be so identified with the promoters or the "agents" or "directors", the 
court would be unlikely to give relief to the aggrieved party against the 
company, and would be likely to leave him to pursue his remedies against 
the "agent". 
(2) Contracts Ultra vires the powers of the Company 
Contracts made by a company which are outside the objects of the 
company are void and therefore unenforceable by either party.22 
Such contracts may be ultra vires in three ways. They may be concerned 
with matters that the company can never validly involve itself in: they may 
involve the company in some transaction beyond a limitation in the 
(1965-6) 39 ALJR 405, 408. 
"The rule has its origins in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd v Riche 
(1857) LR HL 653. 
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memorandum on its involvement; or thcy may be concerned with some- 
thing the company has a power to do, if for a purpose stated in the 
memorandum, but the power is being exercised for a purpose not so stated. 
Of these only the first and last are of real importance. The second cate- 
gory is unlikely to arise except in the context of a lending transaction, 
and s.34(3) of the Companies Act protects such loans unless there has 
been express notice of the breach of the limitation in the memorandum or 
articles. Within the other two categories there are a number of possible 
ways in which the parties can have conducted their dealings. In some of 
them relief may be available under the Contractual Mistakes Act. Because 
an ultra vires contract is void, the Contractual Remedies Act can have 
no application, and misrepresentations as to the company's ability to under- 
take the enterprise in question have not resulted in a contract. Even if such 
void contracts were covered, such a representation would be one of law, 
and it seem? most u~jlikely that the Contractual Remedics Act could cover 
representations of law. It must be noted that the action for breach of war- 
ranty of authority may lie against the persons acting for the company, and 
in this situation there may be fewer difficulties in proving that the lack of 
authority was the cause of the would-be outside contractor's loss. 
However, where both parties have actually turned their minds to the 
question of what the capacity of the company is, but are in error, there is a 
possibility of mistake. This situation may well be very rare, in that it 
seems few people in dealing with a company do actually consider what the 
capacity of the company is. In an exceptional case though, the matter is 
considered important by the parties (as it was in Christchurch City Cor- 
poration v Flatningo Coffee Lounge Ltd23). If the parties erroneously con- 
clude that the company does have capacity to enter the contract, then there 
has been a mistake in the interpretation of a document (the relevant com- 
pany men~orandum and articles)-and that is a mistake of law. If the 
situation had been as the parties had believed it to be there would be a 
contract. In such circumstances, it may be more just to allow a remedy 
under the Contractual Mistakes Act than to leave the outside contractor 
to pursue the rather uncertain restitutionary and equitable remedies that 
may be available. The argument for the granting of a remedy is stronger 
where the company's officers know that the transaction is ultra vires and 
are taking advantage of the outside contractor's error in interpretation. 
The requirement of inequality of value may be satisfied where the outside 
contractor has rendered services or supplied perishable or consumable 
goods and not received a return.24 The advantage of the Contractual Mis- 
takes Act over any restitutionary or quasi-contractual remedy is that under 
the Act he may be allowed to recover damages for loss of profit as well as 
the cost of the goods or services. Equally, the company may be the loser 
by the contract being ultra vires. There seems no reason why the company 
could not seek a remedy under the Act, in such circumstances as are out- 
lined above. 
The position is more difficult where the company is acting for a purpose 
which is ultra vires, but under a power which would be valid if the pur- 
" [I9591 NZLR 986. 
"Some of the instances of inequality of value discussed in relation to pre-incorpor- 
ation contracts might also, mutatis mutandis, be applicable here also. 
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pose was intra vires. Here the courts have held that the contract is only un- 
enforceable by an outside contractor if he knew of the actual purpose of the 
company.25 If the contract is void, the Contractual Remedies Act has 
no application, but if it is not, it seems that it can add little to the rights 
of the outside contractor. In some situations the Contractual Mistakes Act 
might be applicable. The first possibility is where the parties have both 
considered the nature of the power and have erroneously concluded that 
it could be validly exercised for the purpose intended. This would be a 
mistake of law and the position ought to be similar to that discussed above. 
Where neither party or only one of the parties has considered the issue, 
the position is more complicated. The outside contractor is fixed with 
constructive knowledge of the objects of the company, although he will 
only rarely have actual knowledge of them. Is acting inconsistently with 
the constructive knowledge one is held to have sufficient to establish a 
mistake? It is submitted that the courts are unlikely to find this s u f i ~ i e n t . ~ ~  
1f that is the case, then the outside contractor can only claim a mistake 
where he has actually turned his mind to the question of whether the com- 
pany had the capacity to enter the contract. The company, on the other 
hand, surely had actual knowledge of its own capacity. Thus purporting 
to act inconsistently with its own capacity may be evidence of a mistake. 
If there can be established a common mistake, or a case where the out- 
side contractor attempts to take advantage of the company's errors, the 
company ought to be able to seek relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act. 
(3) Contracts intra vires the conzpany but defectively made 
A contract which is made on behalf of the company and is intra vires 
may be open to attack in a number of ways. The first possibility is that 
although the officers of the company have the power to make the contract 
if they are acting for a proper purpose, the officers have in fact acted for 
other, improper, purposes. The second is where the company has the 
power to make the contract, but the officers in making it have exceeded 
their powers or were purporting to exercise the powers of an ofice within 
the company to which they were not validly appointed. The third is where 
the contract purportedly created is in a document not properly executed 
and therefore not binding. 
The general position in the first case is that a person unaware of the 
improper purpose of the directors is entitled to rely on the contract. If 
the outside contractor does know of the improper purpose, then he cannot 
enforce. It  seems from a dictum of Pennycuick J in the Charterbridge 
Corporationz7 case that the outside contractor must not only know of the 
purpose, but know of its impropriety. In these circumstances there seems 
*See Re David Payne & Co Ltd [I9041 2 Ch. 608, Charterbridge Corporation Lrd v 
Lloyds Bank Ltd [I9701 Ch. 62 and Hill v Mattchester Salford Water Works Co. 
(1831) 2 B & A. 544. 
' T h e  doctrine of constructive notice was laid down in Malzoney v East Holyford 
Mining Co. Ltd [I8751 LR 7 HL 869. As to constructive notice and mistake, it is 
submitted that the courts will require actual advertence to the issue about which 
the alleged mistake occurred, see the views of Somers J in Moot v Crown Crystal 
Glass Ltd [I9761 2 NZLR 268, 275 and the authorities discussed there. 
" [I9701 Ch. 62, 75. 
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little scope for the application of either of the contractual statutes. If the 
outside knew of the impropriety, he would not be under any misapprehen- 
sion, and in any case hardly merits any relief. 
The second position is a little more difficult. The cases indicate that an 
outside contractor may rely on the contract made if either the company has 
in some way held the agent with whom he dealt to have authority to make 
the contract, even though he does notB or, to the actual knowledge of the 
outside contractor, the articles could have conferred on the agent the 
powers he claims to exercise and there is nothing to put the outsider on 
notice that the agent may not have the authority he claims.29 The com- 
pany can always ratify contracts not originally binding on the company 
because of a defect of the classes outlined above. Thebe contracts must 
then be considered to be voidable only, and therefore they are contracts 
to which the Contractual Remedies Act may apply. The problem is whether 
the representations of the officers or agents of the company are "representa- 
tions made by or on behalf of" the company.30 On the one hand they are, 
almost by definition, representations which the company has not authorised 
the officers or agents to make. In that sense, the company should not have 
to take responsibility for them. Yet on the other hand, clearly they may 
be representations made, which have induced the outside contractor to 
enter the contract. On that basis, the wording of the Contractual Remedies 
Act would appear to give the outside contractor a right to sue on the mis- 
repre~entat ion.~~ If so, the damages are to be as if the representation were 
a term of the contract which had been breached. The damages would, it 
would appear, thus be the loss the outside contractor had suffered because 
the contract was not binding. This may well compel the company to give 
effect to the contract, or risk heavy damages. It may be that the courts, in 
deciding which interpretation of the two offered above will take the view 
that the legislature could not have intended to overthrow well-established 
rules of company law in such a roundabout manner. Yet the wording of 
the statute does force the courts to consider the matter. It must be added 
that in some situations the representation made by the agents or officers of 
the company may be able to be classified as a representation of law, (i.e. 
that their authority is sufficient to conclude the contracP2 and the courts 
could then refuse relief under the Contractual Remedies Act by saying 
that that act does not cover representations of law. Where the representa- 
tion is clearly one of fact-as it would be by a statement that the agent 
is, for instance, the managing director of the company, the issues discussed 
above will be squarely raised. 
In this category of cases, too, there may be some occasions where the 
our~ide contractor may seek relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act. 
If both the company's agent and the outside contractor believe, as a 
"As in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [I9641 2 
QB 480. 
'*AS in the cases on the rule in Royal British Bank v Turquarzd (1856) 6 E & B 
327. 
'O C.R.A. s.6(1). 
"The Act covers representations by agents. A misrepresentation by the agent which 
is outside his authority should also be covered. 
" Beattie v Lord Ebury (1872) 7 Ch.App. 777. 
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matter of law, that the agent can conclude a contract binding on the com- 
pany, there is a mistake of law which has prevented a contract coming 
into existence. If the company is made a party to the proceedings the court 
can make an order for compensation against the ~ompany.~"  It is even 
possible that an application for relief under this Act can be made where 
the outside contractor has been put on notice that there may be something 
defective about the agent's authority, but has concluded, erroneously, that 
thc agent's authority is adequate to conclude the contract. If that error is 
kinown to the agent, then s.6(l)(a) (i) may be fulfilled, and if the error 
is shared by the agent, then s.6(1) (a) (ii) should apply. It  may well be 
that the courts would not give relief, but the fact that it may be available 
does nothing to clear up a rather complex area of the law. 
The final possibility is where the parties have purported to conclude a 
contract in a form later claimed to be defective. In the case of Brc>adlarzds 
Finance Ltd v Gi.rhnrr7e Aero ClubJ4 the plaintiffs had lent sizeable sums to 
the defendants, such sums supposedly being secured by instruments by 
way of security over certain chattels of the club. It was held that the 
instruments were defective because they had not been duly executed by 
the persons in the manner required by the Club rules. The court rejected 
arguments that the indoor management rule or the principles of ostensible 
authority applied, and held that in the clear absence of express authority 
the instruments were invalid. However, it is clear that both parties believed 
at the time that the mode of execution of the documents was effective to 
bind the club. This could be treated as a clear mistake of law common to 
both parties, which substantially altered the respective burdens under the 
transaction. If the contract supposedly made were to be validated under the 
Contractual Mistakes Act, the courts would merely be giving effect to the 
contract the parties thought they had made. In such cases, it may be that 
the courts would not be reluctant to grant relief. 
( 4 )  Share Sales 
The effect of the Contractual Remedies Act on the sale of shares through 
the issue of a prospectus will, it appears, be dependent on whether the 
company was incorporated at the time of the prospectus or not. If the 
company has been incorporated prior to the issue of the prospectus in ques- 
tion, any misrepresentations malde in that document will found an action 
for damages by the purchaser against the company, and the provisions of 
the Contractual Remedies Act will decide the availability and quantum of 
damages. However the application of the Act may have considerable effect 
where the purchaser discovers the misrepresentation and wishes to with- 
draw from the contract. The position prior to the Contractual Remedies Act 
was that a person who had relied on the representations made in the pros- 
pectus in his subscription for shares, could rescind the contract, provided 
he had not affirmed it in some way or otherwise lost his rights to rescind. 
It does not appear that the rescinding party had to establish fraud35, nor 
'' See C.M.A. s.7 ( 5 ) .  
'' [I9741 1 NZLR 157, affd [I9751 2 NZLR 496. 
"See Anderson's Case (1881)  17 Ch. D. 373, and In re Scottish Petroleum Co. 
(1883) 23 Ch. D. 413. 
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did he have to show any objective diminution of value (though as most 
of the cases were ones of fraud this was obviously present). However, 
under the Contractual Remedies Act, a subscriber for shares will not only 
have to establish that a statement in the prospectus was inaccurate, but 
will have to go on to show that the misrepresentation was as to a matter 
which had been expressly or impliedly agreed by the parties to be essential, 
or that the effect of the misrepresentation will be to substantially reduce his 
benefit, or increase his burdens under the contract, or to substantially 
alter the nature of those benefits or burdens. In the absence of statements 
to the company by the subscriber for shares as to his particular motives 
for investing, it may be difficult to establish any implied or actual agree- 
ment as to what is an essential feature of the bargain (though misrepre- 
sentations as to very basic matters might well be impliedly essential). 
Tf such an agreed matter cannot be established, the subscriber must show 
a substantial variation in the value or nature of his bargain. It is not clear 
whether the Contractual Remedies Act conten~plates an objective standard 
for value. The actual wording might suggest a subjective test-the "benefit 
of the contract to the cancelling party", but a purely subjective test might 
well defeat contractual certainty. Sf the test is objective, then there has 
been a change in the rules relating to cancellation of a sharepurchasing 
contract which may, in certain circumstances, operate against the buyer. 
The problems do not end there. It must be noted that s.9 of the Contractual 
Remedies Act gives the courts wide discretionary powers to adjust the 
position of the parties to a contract which has been cancelled. Thus even 
though the purchaser may have cancelled this may not be the end of the 
matter. The cancelling party who has actually paid money or transferred 
property (as most sharepurchasers will have) is not entitled, simply by his 
cancellation, to that property. It remains with the transferee or payee, until 
and unless the court exercises its discretion under s.9 to order it repaid. 
That discretion cannot be exercised where a third party has acquired an 
interest in the subject matter for valuable consideration, or where the 
order would be made against a party who has altered his position in 
reliance on the contract that an order for relief would be i n e q ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  
It may be doubted whether the position of the shareholder has in fact been 
improved by the introduction of the new legislation. Sf the company is not 
worth suing, the buyer may, of course, pursue the statutory remedies, dis- 
cussed below. 
Different considerations apply where the prospectus is issued by agents 
or promoters of a company to be formed. Here there can be no action 
against the company for any misrepresentations in the prospectus, because 
the company is not in cxistel~ce at the time of the misrepresentations. Any 
action by the purchaser must be against the promoters or "agents" of the 
"company". The question is whether these persons are to be proceeded 
against under the Contractual Remedies Act or under the pre-existing 
Law. It  might appear at first glance that this is an area of the common 
law which has been replaced by the statute, and thus the Act must apply. 
The difficulty lies in s.15(h) of the Act which states that the Act is not 
to apply to any statute "so far as it prescribes or governs terms of con- 
tracts or remedies available in respect of contracts, or governs the enforce- 
= C.R.A. s.9(5) ,  s.9(6) 
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ment of contracts". Both the Companies Act 1955 and the Securities Act 
1978 have specific provisions providing for liability of promoters and others, 
for misstatements in the prospectus of a company to be formed.37 These 
provisions depart from the normal rules of contract existing at that time, 
in that negligent misrepresentations are actionable (insofar as liability 
prima facie exists for misstatements, but the promoter may be exempt 
from liability if he proves he had reasonable grounds for believing, and 
did believe, them to be true). The measure of damages is on a tort basis, 
in that the purchaser is compensated for his loss or damage in entering 
into the contract. He is not compensated for loss of profit. 
There is clearly a considerable difference between the provisions of these 
Acts to that effect, and the provisions of the Contractual Remedies Act. 
There would appear to be a strong argument for the view that because 
there are these specific provisions in the earlier legislation which prescribe 
certain rights and remedies, and limit them in certain ways, that the Con- 
tractual Remedies Act has no application. In regard to the Securities Act 
the argument may be strengthened by reference to s.63, which grants to 
the court a general power to exempt, in certain circumstances, a promoter 
from liability for any "negligence, default or breach of duty". That very 
general provision might well extend, and appears to be designed to 
extend, to negligent statements. If it does, it clearly would indicate that 
there is a discretionary provision governing relief, and thus the Contractual 
Remedies Act is not applicable to this area of law. It  is to be hoped that 
the position will be elucidated in the near future. If the argument is 
accepted that the Contractual Remedies Act does not apply to statements 
by promoters for companies to be formed, the curious result would 
emerge that a purchaser from such promoters could not sue them for an 
innocent misrepresentation made without negligence, but if he repeated 
the misrepresentations, in good faith, to another person who repurchased 
from him, he may be liable for innocent misrepresentation under the Con- 
tractual Remedies Act. Such a result might well seem illogical, but logic 
has not always been the strongest feature of the meshing of the contractual 
reform statutes with other areas of law. 
In share sales cases where there has been a deliberate or an innocent 
misrepresentation. there will often be a mistake coming within s.6 of the 
Contractual Mistakes Act. It is not hard to think of cases where the mis- 
taken belief of the parties has resulted in the taking up of shares that are 
worth far less than they would have been if the promoter's statements had 
been accurate. It  is suggested however that although such cases meet the 
criteria of s.6(1) (a) and (b), it is possible to use s.6(1) (c) to filter out 
some of them-by holding that the investor must be taken to be bearing 
any risk \hat there may be of the company not being the envisaged success. 
Alternatively the courts could simply refuse relief in these circumstances 
as prejudicing commercial certainty. However, until there is a clear indi- 
cation that the courts will take this view, the possibility of a disgruntled 
investor seeking relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act for misrepre- 
sentations which are not actionable because of the provisions of the Com- 
panies r\ct or Securities Act may have to be borne in mind by company 
promotes. 
"Companies Act s.53, Securities Act ss.55, 56, 57, 63. 
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( 5 )  Contracts between a director and the company or the shareholder 
The law imposes on a director of a company certain duties where he 
seeks to transact business with the company of which he is a director to 
deal in shares with shareholders of that company. The duty on a director 
who seeks to deal with the company is in part regulated by the Companies 
Act 1955, s.199, and in part by the general law. The duty in share trans- 
action cases arises purely from the general law. The common element in 
both is that the director will usually be under a duty of disclosure. Is a 
failure to disclose a misrepresentation for which damages or other remedies 
under the Contractual Remedies Act can be sought? On one hand it can 
be argued that the director has not in fact made any statement at all, 
therefore it is a misuse of language to describe the failure to speak as a 
misrepresentation. On the other hand, by failing to speak, he may have 
seriously misled the party with whom he was dealing. Dawson and Mac- 
Lauchlan consider the point and conclude that the non-disclosure cases 
are not covered by the Contractual Remedies Act.38 The Act will however 
apply where the director makes only a partial disclosure which is rendered 
misleading by the omission of relevant material. If this is right, then the 
director who makes no disclosure at all may be liable in equity for a 
breach of fiduciary duty, the remedy for which may be rescission or an 
account for profits. It appears that at the highest burden on the director 
is to refrain from making statements which are deliberately or carelessly 
misleading and to disclose matters he knows or believes are material and 
about which the other party may not be adequately informed.3g If this is 
correct, then the director who attempts to make disclosure may be in a 
worse position than he who says nothing. If a director makes a partial dis- 
closure which is misleading because of its incompleteness, he may be 
liable for any innocent misrepresentation involved therein. If he makes 
no disclosure at all, he will be liable only if he is fraudulent or negligent. 
If the non-disclosure cases are all covered by the Contractual Remedies 
Act, then a director's duties have been rendered more severe by the Con- 
tractual Remedies Act in all cases. Such a position certainly merits the 
attention of the legislature. 
It must be noted that in many of the director's contracts cases an action 
for relief under the Contractual Mistakes Act would clearly be entitled to 
succeed. If the director has induced, by silence or by misrepresentation, 
the other party to enter a contract which he would not have made if he 
had known the true facts, and the contract is thereby less advantageous to 
him, the requirements of that Act would appear to have been fulfilled. In 
these circumstances the wider range of remedies open to the courts may 
be mos+ useful. 
The purpose of this article is to show that the reforms made in the law 
of contract appear to have been made without adequate consideration of 
their application outside the purely contractual sphere. If a number of the 
Op. cit., pp.20-22. 
'DSee Coleman v Myers [I9771 2 NZLR 298, 333, per Cooke I. 
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problems envisaged above in relating the Contractual Mistakes Act and 
the Contractual Remedies Act to the company law field do occur, then 
there must be a long period of confusion while the courts attempt to 
reconcile the new statutes with the traditional rules of company law. Tt 
may well be that a number of the objections taken above will turn out not 
to be important in practice, but it is submitted that a large number will be. 
Failing a review of the relevant legislation it will be for litigants to bear 
the expense of clearing up the uncertainties and lacunae left by the 
reformers. It  would be better if the statutes were reconsidered, and the 
uncertainties removed. 
